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Summary
The Navy is implementing or experimenting with new kinds of naval formations,
more flexible forward-deployment schedules, forward-homeporting additional Navy
ships, and long-duration deployments with crew rotation.  These changes raise several
potential issues for Congress.  This CRS report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
As part of its efforts to transform itself to better meet 21st-Century needs,1 the Navy
is implementing or experimenting with changes to its traditional methods for deploying
its forces overseas.  These changes involve new kinds of naval formations, more flexible
deployment schedules, homeporting additional Navy ships at forward locations, and long-
duration deployments with crew rotation.  Each of these changes is discussed below.
New Kinds Of Naval Formations.  The Navy traditionally organized itself into
aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs).  A CVBG
typically included 1 aircraft carrier, about 6 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, 1 or 2 attack
submarines, and 1 or 2 supply ships.  An ARG typically included 3 amphibious ships that
together were capable of embarking a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which is a force
of about 2,200 Marines, their ground-combat equipment, and an aircraft detachment.
ARGs traditionally have operated overseas in the company of CVBGs.  Although
individual surface combatants, amphibious ships, and attack submarines have often
deployed independent of CVBGs and ARGs, the Navy traditionally was defined primarily
by the number of CVBGs and ARGs it includes.  The plan for a 310-ship Navy set forth
in the final report of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), for example, is
characterized as a 12-CVBG, 12-ARG fleet.
Navy officials believe this way of organizing the Navy does not offer sufficient
flexibility for responding to the potential need for deploying significant naval capability
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in several locations around the world at the same time.  Navy officials also believe that
with the increasing capabilities of Navy ships, naval formations other than the large
CVBG/ARG combination can now be sufficient to perform certain missions.
As a result, the Navy is implementing a new Global Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) that reorganizes the Navy into a larger number of independently deployable,
strike-capable formations.  The most significant change under the plan is the conversion
of the 12 ARGs into independently deployable formations called Expeditionary Strike
Groups (ESGs).  ESGs are ARGs that have been reinforced with surface combatants and
attack submarines carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles, and land-based P-3 Orion long-
range maritime patrol aircraft.  The Global CONOPS also contemplates creating
independently deployable surface strike groups (SSGs), each consisting of a few surface
combatants (most or all Tomahawk-armed), and independent operations by 4 Trident
SSGN submarines that have been converted to carry Tomahawks and special operations
forces.2  CVBGs under the Global CONOPS plan have been redesignated Carrier Strike
Groups (CSGs).  Implementing the Global CONOPS is changing the Navy from a fleet
with 12 independently deployable CVBG/ARG formations into one with 24 major
independently deployable strike groups (12 CSGs and 12 ESGs) and additional
independently deployable capabilities in the form of SSGs and Trident SSGNs.
More Flexible Forward-Deployment Schedules.  The Navy in recent decades
has maintained a continuous or near-continuous forward-deployed presence in three major
overseas operating areas — the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region, and
the Western Pacific.  The Navy’s primary means of maintaining this presence has been
the standard six-month deployment.  Although the six-month limit on deployment length
and the predictability of the rotational deployment schedule have been considered key to
the Navy’s ability to maintain its forward deployments while meeting its personnel
recruiting and retention goals, Navy officials have concluded that the deterrent value of
forward-deployed naval forces might be enhanced by making naval forward deployments
more flexible and less predictable. Navy officials have also concluded that orienting Navy
readiness toward maintaining standard six-month deployments results in a fleet that offers
insufficient flexibility for responding to the potential need for surging large numbers of
naval forces in a short time to respond to major regional contingencies. 
As a result, although six-month deployments will still take place, the Navy will put
more flexibility into its deployment plans by deploying some CSGs and ESGs for less
than or more than six months, as operational needs dictate.  In addition, the Navy is
implementing a new Fleet Response Plan (FRP) that will improve the Navy’s ability to
surge multiple formations in response to emergencies.  Under the FRP, CSGs and ESGs
that have just returned from deployments will be kept, for a time, on alert for potential
short-notice redeployment if needed, and CSGs and ESGs that are approaching their next
scheduled deployment will be maintained in a higher readiness status so that they, too,
could be deployed on short notice.  Implementing the FRP, Navy officials say, will permit
the Navy to deploy up to 6 of its CSGs within 30 days, and an additional 2 CSGs within
another 60 days after that.  For this reason, the FRP has also been referred to as the “6+2”
CRS-3
3 Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: GAO’s Observations on Maintenance
Aspects of the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan.  Washington, 2004, p. 3.  (Letter-report and briefing
to the Honorable Jerry Lewis, June 18, 2004, GAO-04-724R Defense Logistics).
plan.  In June 2004, the General Accounting Office, or GAO (which in July 2004 was
renamed the Government Accountability Office) reported that the FRP
does not shorten preexisting time frames for performing aircraft carrier maintenance.
Furthermore, it does not alter existing major repair and maintenance requirements;
methods of upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering
systems; or methods of performing nuclear refueling. At this time, the potential impact
of the plan on the Navy’s budget is uncertain.3
Forward-Homeporting Additional Ships.  Homeporting Navy ships in
overseas locations, called forward homeporting, can reduce transit times from home port
to operating area and thus permit a Navy of a certain size to provide a larger number of
ship days on station in overseas operating areas.  The U.S. Navy’s principal forward
homeporting location is Japan, where the Navy since the early 1970s has forward
homeported a CVBG and ARG.  The Navy traditionally has also forward-homeported a
small number of other ships, such as fleet command ships and repair ships, in forward
locations such as Italy and the U.S. territory of Guam.
Forward homeporting requires a site with a port that offers suitable infrastructure.
In addition, forward homeporting has significant potential operational disadvantages,
including (if the location is a foreign country) host-nation limits on how the naval forces
may be used (which reduces the sovereign flexibility that naval forces are supposed to
provide U.S. policymakers); a reduced ability to send the forward-homeported naval
forces to another region because the host nation and its neighbors might perceive the
deployment as a reduction in U.S. commitment to the host nation’s region (which can
reduce the geographic flexibility that naval forces are supposed to provide U.S.
policymakers); and the potential for sudden eviction due to changes in the host nation’s
policies (which can undermine force-sizing calculations based on the availability of that
overseas home port).  Forward homeporting also transfers the economic activity
associated with ship homeporting (e.g., sailors spending their pay for goods and services,
and ship maintenance and repair work) from a U.S. home port to a foreign home port.
The Navy recently has taken steps to increase the number of forward-homeported
Navy ships.  Four mine warfare ships have been forward-homeported at Bahrain in the
Persian Gulf, and three attack submarines have been homeported at Guam.  The Navy is
also studying the idea of transferring an aircraft carrier from the continental United States
to Guam or Hawaii, and the idea of transferring additional attack submarines to Guam.
Increasing the number of ships forward-homeported in the Pacific is viewed as improving
the Navy’s ability to respond to potential contingencies in locations such as the Korean
Peninsula or the Taiwan Strait.
Long-Duration Deployments With Crew Rotation.  As a potential fourth
change, the Navy is experimenting with the concept of long-duration deployments with
crew rotation.  This concept, which the Navy now calls Sea Swap, is another way  to
reduce the amount of time that deployed ships spend transiting to and from operating
areas.  It involves deploying Navy ships overseas for periods such as 12, 18, or 24 months
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rather than 6 months, and rotating successive crews out to the ships for 6-month periods
of duty.  Crew changes occur in a friendly port located near the forward operating area.
Crews travel between the United States and the changeover port by aircraft, and the
departing crew spends some time at the port together with the replacement crew to
familiarize the replacement crew with the ship and the operating area.  The departing crew
then returns to the United States and takes over the ship that had been operated by the
replacement crew, so that the two crews wind up swapping their ships.  Potential
disadvantages of Sea Swap include extensive wear and tear on the ship due to lengthy
periods of time at sea, a reduced sense of crew “ownership” of a given ship (which might
reduce a crew’s incentive to keep the ship in good condition), and reduced opportunities
for transit port calls (which have diplomatic value and are beneficial for recruiting and
retention).
The Navy has recently completed two Sea Swap experiments.  One involved a
Spruance (DD-963) class destroyer that was deployed to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf
region for 24 months and operated by four crews.  The other experiment involved an
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer that was deployed to the same region for 18
months and operated by three crews.  Navy officials have characterized the experiments
successful in terms of ship days on station, total costs, ship maintenance and material
condition, and crew re-enlistment rates during deployment.  In July and August 2004, it
was reported that a review of the Sea Swap experiment conducted by the Center for Naval
Analyses found that although Sea Swap was successful in these terms, crew members
participating in the experiment who were surveyed viewed the concept negatively and
indicated they would be less likely to stay in the Navy if all deployments were conducted
this way.
Navy officials have said they are interested in extending the Sea Swap concept to
other types of ships, including patrol craft (where a Sea Swap experiment is currently
underway), mine warfare ships, and entire ESGs.  In April 2004, it was reported that the
Navy was considering reducing the planned number of ESGs from 12 to 8, in large part
because application of the Sea Swap concept could reduce the number of ESGs needed
to maintain required levels of ESGs in overseas operating areas.
In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 19, 2002, a Navy
official described an approach for applying crew rotation to aircraft carriers under which
a carrier would be assigned a crew equivalent to 125% of its required manning.  The ship
would then be deployed for 9 months at a time with 100% crewing, and 25% of the crew
would rotate on and off the ship every 2 and 1/4 months.4  The Navy reportedly expressed
a similar idea in July 2004.5
A November 2004 GAO report on the sea basing concept concluded the following:
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To effectively institutionalize and implement change, best practices show that a
comprehensive analytical framework provides useful information to decision makers.
However, the Navy has not established such an analytical framework — consisting
of formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics — that could be used to assess the
feasibility of various rotational crewing options and determine their impact on
operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale.  Further, the Navy has not
systematically collected or developed accurate cost data to perform complete
cost-effective analyses.  Absent such information, the Navy may not know the full
impact of rotating crews on surface ships, the extent to which the various options
should be implemented, or whether it is getting maximum return on investment.
Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative, the Navy
has not provided effective guidance when implementing the practice and has not
systematically leveraged lessons learned.  Effective guidance and sharing of lessons
learned are key tools used to institutionalize change and facilitate efficient operations.
While the Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for
ballistic missile submarines that include appropriately documenting a ship’s condition
and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not provided comparable guidance
to surface ships.  As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes that
could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale.
Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational
crewing has not been fully assessed.  Effective maintenance strategies help ensure
ships can perform their missions without adverse impacts on crew morale.  It is a
challenge to ensure the mission capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods
because most maintenance and repair is usually completed between 6-month
deployments.  While rotating crews has enabled the Navy to keep ships deployed for
up to 24 months, the service has not fully examined all issues related to the best
maintenance strategies that could affect a ship’s condition and crew’s morale.  Absent
effective strategies, the Navy risks degrading long-term ship condition and
discouraging crew support for rotational crewing.6
Issues For Congress
Planned Size of the Navy.  In the post-Cold War era, the number of ships needed
to maintain forward deployments has been the primary factor in determining the planned
size of the Navy.  Will the four changes discussed above permit a reduction in the planned
size of the Navy, and if so, by how much?  Is the Navy’s announcement about possibly
reducing the planned number of ESGs an indicator of potential reductions for other
categories of ships?7
Effect on Ship Maintenance.  How will these changes, particularly the FRP and
the forward-homeporting of additional ships, affect the distribution of Navy ship overhaul
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and repair work?  Will they lead to increased work for some yards and decreased work
for others?  If so, which yards stand to gain or lose work?
Funding For Increased Readiness.  How much additional funding will be
needed under the FRP to maintain higher readiness levels for ships?  What other Navy
spending priorities might need to be cut to finance any additional readiness-related
expenditures?
Options for Additional Forward Homeporting.  The final report of the 2001
QDR directed the Navy to explore options for homeporting an additional three to four
surface combatants, and Trident SSGN submarines, in the Western Pacific?  What are the
Navy’s intentions regarding this idea?  Although the Navy has homeported 3 attack
submarines at Guam, a March 2002 CBO report presented an option for homeporting as
many as 11 attack submarines there.8  In addition, the Navy in the past has examined
options for forward-homeporting Navy ships in locations like the Mediterranean and
Australia.  Should these options be pursued?
Multiple Crewing and Crew Rotation.  Another potential strategy for increasing
the percentage of time that Navy ships can be deployed is multiple crewing, which would
involve maintaining more than one crew for each Navy ship.  Potential versions of
multiple-crewing include having two crews for each ship (dual crewing), three crews for
every two ships, four crews for every three ships, or five crews for every four ships.  For
many years, the Navy’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) have been
operated successfully with dual crews.  In 1997, a Navy study panel proposed multiple-
crewing for other kinds of ships as part of a plan called the Horizon Concept.9  The above-
mentioned March 2002 CBO report presented the option of applying multiple crewing to
the attack submarine fleet.
Potential disadvantages of multiple crewing include the costs of recruiting, training,
and retaining additional crews, the difficulty of achieving fully realistic training using
land-based simulators, a reduced sense of crew “ownership” of a given ship, and increased
wear and tear on the ship due to more intensive use of the ship at sea (which can reduce
ship life).  The crew ownership issue does not appear to have led to any significant
material condition problems for the Navy’s SSBNs.  Aside from the SSBNs, however, the
Navy’s existing ships were not designed to be operated intensively at sea with multiple
crews.
For multiple crewing and crew rotation, potential questions for Congress include Are
these concepts more suitable for some kinds of Navy ships than others?  How might they
affect the readiness of forward-deployed ships?  Should future Navy ships be designed to
support multiple crewing and long-duration deployments with crew rotation?
